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Abstract
Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries. Most partnerships
share profits equally among the partners. Following Kandel and Lazear (1992) it is
often argued that “peer pressure” mitigates the arising free-rider problem. This line
of reasoning takes the equal sharing rule as exogenously given. The purpose of our
paper is to show that with inequity averse partners – a behavioral assumption akin to
peer pressure – the equal sharing rule arises endogenously as an optimal solution to the
incentive problem in a partnership.
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1 Introduction
Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries, such as law, account-
ing, investment banking, management consulting, or medicine.1 The defining features of
a partnership are (i) the joint production of output and (ii) the distribution of the profits
among the partners. While there are many systems by which profits can be divided among
partners, equal profit sharing appears to be widely used.2 From the viewpoint of incentive
theory, this is a puzzling observation. Partnerships that employ a simple equal profit
sharing rule are prone to the free-rider problem. Each partner bears her full effort cost but
receives only 1/N of the profits in a partnership of size N . However, the fact that many
such partnerships are observed, suggests that free-riding is not necessarily a problem. A
prominent explanation is proposed by Kandel and Lazear (1992).3 They demonstrate that
“peer pressure” can mitigate the free-riding problem. The basic insight is that peer pressure
complements monetary incentives: if a partner shirks, he feels guilt or shame, or has to take
social reprisals, which prevents him from shirking.
In Kandel and Lazear’s analysis, however, the equal sharing rule is assumed, and given the
equal sharing rule they analyze how peer pressure can overcome the free-riding problem.4
The purpose of our paper is to show that with inequity averse partners – a behavioral
assumption that nests guild or shame – the equal sharing rule can be derived as the optimal
solution to the incentive problem in a partnership. Interestingly, the result on the optimality
1See Hansmann (1996) for a detailed account of professions where partnerships are widespread.
2Encinosa, Gaynor, and Rebitzer (2007) analyze data on medical group practices and report that 54.2% of
small practices (3-5 physicians) have an equal sharing rule in place and that 46% of all groups in their sample
fall into this (smallest) category (Table 2, p. 199). Similarly, Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) have data on law
firms. They write: “The first and most straightforward system is that all members with the same seniority
receive the same profit share. Since junior partners eventually become senior partners, such a system would
be equal division if the firm’s profitability were constant over time. Such a sharing scheme [...] is probably
used by most two or three-person law firms, which account for about 2/3 of all firms (although less than half
the lawyers)”(p. 293).
3There is also a literature that offers contractual solutions to the free-riding problem. For instance, Holm-
stro¨m (1982) points to the role of a budget-breaker and Miller (1997) proposes reporting schemes based on
mutual monitoring.
4Other papers that take equal sharing rules as given in their analyses of partnerships are, e.g., Farrell and
Scotchmer (1988) and Levin and Tadelis (2005).
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of the equal sharing rule is not driven by the partners’ direct preference for sharing rules
that induce egalitarian outcomes. Rather, we show that equal sharing rules maximize the
incentives of the partner who has the weakest incentives to exert effort.
In our model, we analyze partnerships in which each partner decides whether or not to
contribute effort to some joint production. Effort is observable but not verifiable. Contracts
can condition on output, but they cannot assign monetary payments depending on individual
partners’ effort choices. Consequently, the classic free-rider problem may arise. Partners can
renegotiate the contract after they have made their effort decisions. We assume that partners
are inequity averse; they suffer a utility loss whenever other partners receive different rents
defined as monetary payoff minus effort costs.5
There are the following results. We first show how inequity aversion affects renegotiations.
If partners are highly inequity averse, renegotiations always result in an equal division of
rents independently of the original contract. Since each partner is compensated for his effort
costs and receives an equal share in the joint surplus, they make efficient effort choices.
In case partners are not highly inequity averse, contracts are not renegotiated if they are
budget-balancing. Contracts thus determine incentives. We can now derive our main result:
If there exists some contract that induces all partners to exert effort, an equal sharing rule
also induces all partners to exert effort. The converse is not true.
Furthermore, given the equal sharing rule as optimal contractual solution, we can derive the
condition on the degree of inequity aversion and the production technology under which all
partners exert effort. If the production technology has non-increasing returns to scale, our
results imply that cooperation in partnerships becomes more difficult to sustain as the group
size increases. This accords to the observation that the fraction of partnerships with equal
sharing rules decreases with team size.6
5There exists ample experimental evidence on the existence and prevalence of such social preferences. See
Camerer (2003) and Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a survey of the literature.
6In their data on medical group practices, Encinosa et al. (2007) report that the fraction of practices with
equal sharing rule falls from 54.2% in practices with 3-5 physicians, to 42% in practices with 6-7 physicians,
to roughly 20-30% on average for larger practices (Table 2, p. 199).
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The present paper is closely related to a growing literature that studies the impact of social
preferences in moral hazard problems with multiple agents.7 These articles find that inequity
aversion can improve incentives since agents work harder to avoid suffering from unfavorable
inequality. For example, Itoh (2004), Demougin and Fluet (2006), and Rey Biel (2007)
show that optimal contracts might actually generate inequality to capitalize on this positive
incentive effect. In contrast, we demonstrate that sharing rules that minimize inequality
maximize incentives in partnerships if partners are inequity averse.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 describes
the influence of inequity aversion on renegotiation and derives the optimality of equal sharing
rules. Section 4 discusses implications of our results for the efficiency of effort provision and
the size of partnerships. Section 5 concludes. All formal proof are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Joint Production, Effort, and Information
Consider a partnership of N identical agents (partners) who can produce joint output x. Let
N = {1, 2, .., N} denote the set of agents in a partnership of size N . Each agent i chooses an
effort contribution ei ∈ {0, 1} to joint production. Individual effort choices are not verifiable.
Effort ei causes costs c(ei), where c(1) = c > 0 and c(0) = 0. Thus, an agent “works” if she
chooses high effort and “shirks” if she chooses low effort. Let e = 〈ei, e−i〉 be an effort vector
consisting of agent i’s effort ei and the vector e−i of all other agents’ effort choices. Joint
output is a deterministic function x of the number of agents working. It does not depend
on the identity of the agents that either work or shirk. Thus, output reveals the number of
agents that work not whether a particular agent worked or shirked. Let x(K) denote joint
output if K agents work. Define ∆x(K) = x(K) − x(K − 1) as the marginal contribution
of the K-th working agent. Output is observable and verifiable, and it is sold at a price
normalized to unity. Thus, the revenue is x(K) when K agents work.
7For articles where an agent compares herself with the principal, see Glazer and Dur (2007) or Englmaier
and Wambach (2005). For further articles that study social comparisons among agents, see for example
Demougin, Fluet, and Helm (2006) or Neilson and Stowe (2005).
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Contracts
Though we will allow for renegotiation, the relationship between the agents is initially
governed by a formal contract. A contract S is a vector valued function that specifies how
the revenue generated by the agents is distributed among the agents. In a partnership, agents
work closely together and thus know who puts in effort and who does not. Hence, we assume
that agents can observe the other agents’ effort decisions but that this information is not
verifiable to a court. A contract can thus condition the distribution of the revenue only on
joint output (but not on individual agents’ effort choices). For each number K, the number
of agents that work, a contract S specifies a vector S(K) that consists of the individual mon-
etary payoffs si(K) for each agent i ∈ N . Define y(K) =
∑
si(K) as the sum of monetary
payoffs that is allocated to the agents, and ∆y(K) = y(K)− y(K − 1) as the change in this
aggregate payment if K agents rather than K−1 agents work. Money can be “burned” but a
contract cannot distribute more than the entire output. Further, we assume limited liability
so that all payments must be non-negative. This implies y(K) ≤ x(K) and si(K) ≥ 0 for all i.
The following definitions are used frequently. A contract is called “budget-balancing at K”
if y(K) = x(K). It is “budget-balancing” if it is budget-balancing at all K ∈ {0, 1, ..., N}.
Further, a contract is “equal at K” if si(K) = sj(K) for all i, j ∈ N so that all agents get
the same monetary payoff in case K agents work. It is “equal at the top” if it is equal at
K ∈ {N − 1, N} and thus all agents get the same monetary payoff in case all agents or all
but one agent work.
Inequity Aversion and Agents’ Utility Functions
There exists ample empirical evidence that individuals contribute costly effort to joint pro-
duction in partnerships although this is inconsistent with the neo-classical model of rational
behavior. Contributions might be driven by social sanctions of other members of the partner-
ship, by internalized social norms, or by guilty feeling when cheating letting the others down.
To model such cooperative behavior we refer to the theory of inequity aversion as proposed
Fehr and Schmidt (1999).8 Agents have the following utility function. Within a partnership
of N agents consider an effort vector e with K agents working with corresponding vector
8For a detailed discussion of social preferences see Camerer (2003) or Fehr and Schmidt (2006).
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S(K) of monetary payoffs. First, define agent i’s rent as her monetary payoff net of effort
cost
ui(e, S(K)) = si(K)− c(ei). (1)
In accordance with classic equity theory agents incorporate effort costs and compare rents.9
We can now define an agent’s preferences as follows.
Assumption 1 Within a partnership of N agents consider an effort vector e with K agents
working with corresponding vector S(K) of monetary payoffs. Then let
vi(e, S(K)) = ui(e, S(K))
− α 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
max
[
uj(e, S(K))− ui(e, S(K)), 0
]
− β 1
N − 1
N∑
j=1, j 6=i
max
[
ui(e, S(K))− uj(e, S(K)), 0
]
denote agent i’s utility.
The parameters α and β measure the importance of inequity concerns for the agents. As
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) we assume that an agent suffers a utility loss if she receives a rent
different than other agents, but suffers more from inequity if it is not in her favor, α ≥ β
and 1 > β ≥ 0. We normalize the agents’ utility to zero if they decide not to work in a
partnership.
Sequence of Actions, Renegotiation, and Equilibrium
We want to characterize contracts that induce all agents in a partnership of given size to
exert effort. In partnerships renegotiations are likely because there is no outside ownership.
Renegotiation should be expected to influence ex-post payoffs, which in turn determine
ex-ante effort incentives. For example, agents could initially agree on a contract that divides
output evenly if all agents work but “burns” the entire output if at least one agent shirks.
Since every agent’s effort decision is pivotal, all agents have incentives to work. However,
Holmstro¨m (1982) shows that such a contract is not renegotiation-proof. Once an agent has
9According to equity theory individuals want a fair relationship between inputs (in our model effort) and
outputs (in our model monetary payoffs). Agents thus account for effort costs in their social comparisons. See
Festinger (1957) and Adams (1963).
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shirked all agents can agree to equally divide what ought to be burnt. Because all agents
profit from redistribution, renegotiation renders the initial contract not credible.
We capture renegotiation in the following way. Consider a partnership of size N with initial
contract S. There is the following sequence of actions. First, agents simultaneously make
their effort choice. Second, output is observed. If for example K agents work, the initial
contract S endows agents with legal claims on monetary payoffs as summarized by the
monetary payoff vector S(K). The contract thereby sets the stage for renegotiations. Third,
agents might renegotiate the monetary payoff vector S(K). Finally, payoffs are realized.
Instead of modeling the renegotiation process explicitly we make the following assumptions.
For once, agents anticipate that certain monetary payoff vectors and thus certain contracts are
renegotiation-proof in the following sense. A monetary payoff vector S(K) is “renegotiation-
proof” if and only if there exists no S′(K) that strictly increases the utility of at least one
agent without reducing the utility of at least one other agent. A contract S is “renegotiation-
proof” if and only if for allK ∈ {0, 1, ..., N} the monetary payoff vector S(K) is renegotiation-
proof for all effort vectors e with K agents working. Note that this definition distinguishes
between renegotiation-proof monetary payoff vectors S(K) and renegotiation-proof contracts
S. To preclude renegotiation as far as possible we restrict attention to contracts that are
renegotiation-proof whenever possible. Yet in the following section we show that if agents
are highly inequity averse (to be made precise below), no contract is renegotiation proof. To
pin down the result of renegotiation in this case we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2 Consider an effort vector e with K agents working. If the monetary
payoff vector S(K) is not renegotiation-proof, renegotiation results in a Pareto-efficient
renegotiation-proof payoff vector S′(K).
We can now define what constitutes equilibrium effort choices. In our reduced form game
(renegotiation is not modeled explicitly) a worker’s pure strategy is simply an effort choice.
A Nash-equilibrium then consists of effort choices for all agents i ∈ N that are mutually
optimal given an initial contract S and the anticipated renegotiations.
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3 Optimality of Equal Sharing Rules
Inequity Aversion and Renegotiation
Before we proof the optimality of equal sharing rules, we have to analyze the impact of
inequity aversion on renegotiations. This is captured in the following proposition. All formal
proofs can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1 (Renegotiation) Consider an effort vector e with K agents working.
1. If β < (N−1)/N , then S(K) is renegotiation-proof if and only if it is budget-balancing.
2. If β ≥ (N − 1)/N , then S(K) is renegotiation-proof if and only if it is budget-balancing
and ui(e, S) = uj(e, S) for all agents i, j ∈ N .
This result is based on the following intuition. Suppose S(K) is not budget-balancing.
Consider the following new allocation: Take the part of the output that ought to be burned
and divide it equally among the agents. This increases the monetary payoff of all agents
without changing their relative standing. All agents thus agree. In the ensuing analysis we
thus restrict attention to contracts that are budget-balancing.
Further, if agents are not highly inequity averse, β < (N−1)/N , then every budget-balancing
contract is renegotiation-proof. In this case agents do not agree to a reduction in their
monetary payoffs even if the redistribution decreases inequity by increasing the monetary
payoffs of the agents that are worse off. Any meaningful redistribution of a budget-balancing
monetary payoff vector requires that the monetary payoff of at least one agent is reduced.
This agent vetoes any renegotiations.
But if agents are highly inequity averse, β ≥ (N −1)/N , a budget-balancing monetary payoff
vector S(K) need not be renegotiation-proof. In this case agents are so keen on diminishing
inequity amongst themselves so that they hand over some of their monetary payoff to agents
being worse off. S(K) is thus renegotiation-proof if and only if it is budget-balancing and all
agents receive the same rent irrespective of their effort choice. Thus, a renegotiation-proof
contract S must condition the vector of monetary payoffs not only on the number of agents
working but on the entire effort vector e. This is unfeasible as individual effort choices are
not contractible. Contrary to an individual monetary payoff vector S(K), a contract S can
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thus never be renegotiation-proof if agents are highly inequity averse.
To summarize: We want contracts to be renegotiation-proof (as far as possible) and thus limit
attention to budget-balancing contracts. If agents are highly inequity averse, no contract
is renegotiation proof. We then assume that renegotiation results in a renegotiation-proof
distribution of monetary payoffs and thus in a budget-balancing monetary payoff vector that
equalizes all agents’ rents.
Optimal Contracts
We can now present our main result. We derive optimal contracts that provide all agents
with incentives to work. Although there is usually no unique optimal contract, the following
proposition shows that a contract that is equal at the top is always optimal.
Proposition 2 (Equal Sharing Rule) Suppose there exists a budget-balancing contract S
with aggregate payments y(N) and y(N−1) that induces all agents to work. Then there exists
a budget-balancing contract S′ with identical aggregate payments that is equal at the top and
induces all agents to work.
If agents are highly inequity averse, β ≥ (N − 1)/N , incentives are essentially determined by
renegotiation. Contracts are then irrelevant and Proposition 2 is trivially satisfied. In the
more interesting case agents are not highly inequity averse, β < (N − 1)/N , and contracts
determine incentives. For an illustration of Proposition 2 consider a contract that is not
equal at the top. Then there exists an agent, say agent i, who gets the lowest monetary
payoff if all agents work. Since all agents incur the same effort costs if all agents work,
agent i then holds the lowest rank - the lowest relative position - with respect to her rent.
Consider the following changes in the contract. Agent i’s monetary payoff is increased in
case N − 1 and in case N agents work. These changes satisfy the following properties. First,
what is given to agent i is taken from the others so that the monetary payoff vector remains
budget-balancing. Second, agent i’s incentives are held constant.
This change in contract has the following incentive effects. Agents suffer more from being
worse off than from being better off than others. Therefore, the lower the rank of an agent
the higher the utility gain from increasing her monetary payoff. By choice of agent i her
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rank cannot be lower if she is the only agent shirking as compared to the situation in which
everybody works - in the latter case she already holds the lowest possible rank. To keep
her incentives unchanged, her monetary payoff need never be increased by a larger amount
if all agents work than if only one agent shirks. This has the following implication for the
incentives of the other agents. Due to budget-balance the monetary payoff of all other agents
decreases weakly more if one agent shirks than if all agents work. As in the considered case
agents are not highly inequity averse and hence enjoy having a higher monetary payoff, their
incentives to work are never harmed but potentially improved. Thus, the proposed change
renders the contract more equal without harming incentives or altering aggregate payments.
Iterated application of this procedure finally results in a contract that is equal at the top.
Importance of Inequity Aversion for Equal Sharing Rules
It is key to understand that Proposition 2 derives the optimality of equal sharing rules by
only referring to agents’ incentives to exert effort. Optimal contracts are equal at the top
not because inequity averse agents have a preference for equal sharing rules (that minimize
inequality). Instead, a contract that is equal at the top maximizes the incentive of the agent
who has the weakest incentive to work. In this sense the contract “maximizes minimum
incentives.”
In contrast to the case with inequity aversion, maximizing minimum incentives does not
generate a trend towards equal sharing rules if agents are selfish. Selfish agents’ effort
choices depend only on the resulting changes in their effort costs and changes in their
monetary payoffs. Therefore, maximizing minimum incentives only requires that the changes
in monetary payoffs (if one agent shirks) are the same for all agents. Thus the change in
aggregate monetary payoffs must be divided equally. Making the level of payoffs more equal
has no effect on incentives. This does not hold true if agents are inequity averse, as such
agents also take into account how shirking affects their rank.
As illustration consider a team of three agents with production technology x(2) = 6 and
x(3) = 12. A contract specifying S(2) = (1, 2, 3) and S(3) = (3, 4, 5) provides selfish agents
with equal effort incentives as shirking reduces each agent’s monetary payoff by two. Making
this contract equal at the top does not affect incentives. However, suppose agents are inequity
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averse and c = 3. If all agents work, they get rents (0, 1, 2). If agent 1 shirks, the agents
get rents (1,−1, 0). Agent 1’s incentives to work are thus (3/2)β − 1 − (3/2)α. Consider
a contract that is equal at the top so that S′(2) = (2, 2, 2) and S′(3) = (4, 4, 4). Agent 1’s
incentives to work are then (3/2)β−1. Making the contract equal at the top strictly improves
incentives. Therefore, inequity aversion offers an explanation for why equal sharing rules are
often used in partnerships.
4 Further Results
Efficient Production in Partnerships
The impact of inequity aversion on incentives can now be easily derived. If agents are highly
inequity averse, there is the following result.
Corollary 1 Suppose β ≥ (N − 1)/N and consider a partnership of size N . If and only if
∆x(N) ≥ c,
then all agents working forms a Nash-equilibrium.
If agents are highly inequity averse, then renegotiation ensures that all agents get equal
rents. Each agent thus knows that she will be compensated for the incurred effort cost and
in addition receive a share 1/N of the generated surplus distributed to the agents. If N
agents work, the surplus is the agents’ aggregate monetary payoff minus the sum of their
effort costs, y(N) − N c. Each agent thus has incentives to exert effort if and only if her
effort costs are smaller than the resulting increase in aggregate payment. If agents are highly
inequity averse, ex-post renegotiation solves the free-rider problem.
If agents are not highly inequity averse, budget-balancing contracts are not renegotiated and
directly determine incentives. By Proposition 2 we can restrict attention to contracts that
are equal at the top. Therefore, it is possible to derive the precise conditions under which all
agents working can form a Nash-equilibrium.
Corollary 2 Suppose β < (N − 1)/N and consider a partnership of size N . If and only if
∆x(N)
N
≥ (1− β) c,
then all agents working forms a Nash-equilibrium.
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Corollary 2 is based on the following argument. Take a contract that is equal at the top. If
an agent shirks whereas all other agents work, her monetary payoff is reduced by her share
∆x(N)/N in the reduction of the aggregate payment to all agents. She saves c on effort
costs. Since the agent is inequity averse she suffers βc from cheating the other agents. Thus,
an agent has no incentive to shirk if and only if ∆x(N)/N ≥ (1− β) c.
The above results imply that if all agents working is not efficient, it is not implementable.
Thus, inequity aversion can never support cooperation in inefficiently large partnerships.
Further, inequity aversion facilitates cooperation: There exist situations in which all agents
working is implementable if and only if agents are inequity averse. The condition for exerting
effort depends on the agents’ degree of inequity aversion. If agents are highly inequity averse,
β ≥ (N − 1)/N , they anticipate renegotiation and thus have an incentive to maximize joint
surplus. If agents are not highly inequity averse, β < (N−1)/N , they know that there will be
no renegotiation. They are thus not interested in the joint surplus. Yet if an inequity averse
agent shirks whereas all other agents work, she incurs a utility loss from being better off
than all other agents. If this “shame for cheating” outweighs the - potential - increase in her
rent, the agent abstains from shirking. Putting it differently, inequity averse agents overcome
the team production problem if “compassion” or “shame for cheating” is large enough. It
is this behavioral trait of “feeling bad” when cheating the others that creates incentives to
exert effort. In contrast a selfish agent does not bear these behavioral costs, which makes
cooperation more difficult to sustain.
Inequity Aversion and Size of Partnerships
Proposition 2 shows that one can restrict attention to equal sharing rules if all agents are
to exert effort. Corollary 1 and 2 then imply that the minimum level of inequity aversion
required to sustain cooperation increases with the size N of the firm if ∆x(N)/N decreases.
The present paper therefore can explain why small partnerships often work well in reality
whereas larger ones frequently suffer from free-riding. Further, inequity aversion increases
the maximum supportable team size as it facilitates cooperation.
At least since Ward (1958) it is well known in the literature that equal sharing rules restrict
the maximum size of partnerships as existing partnerships are only willing to accept a new
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member if the latter increases average profitability. Yet absent inequity aversion it is not
clear why new team members have to be given an equal share in total profits. In fact, in law
or consultancy firms senior partners usually get higher shares of the joint profit as compared
to junior partners. The following numerical example shows that inequity aversion restricts
how unequal a contract can treat partners if all agents are to work hard.
Consider a firm consisting of two agents, agent 1 and 2. If both agents exert effort, they each
incur effort costs c = 1 but produce joint output x(2) = 10. Suppose both divide revenue
evenly, and that both agents working forms a Nash-equilibrium. Thus, both get a rent of 4
if firm size is 2. However, the firm has the opportunity to expand and employ an agent 3. If
all three agents work, output increases to x(3) = 13. Agent 3 has effort costs c = 1. As the
increase of 3 in joint output exceeds the effort costs of 1 it is efficient to expand and employ
the agent. Suppose all agents are selfish. Then an unequal contract with S(3) = (5, 5, 3) and
S(4, 4, 2) is budget-balancing and provides efficient effort incentives for all. Since the rents of
agents 1 and 2 are unchanged, they allow agent 3 to join their partnership. However, suppose
agents are inequity averse. Agent 3 then receives utility 2 − 2α if she workers, whereas she
gets utility 2 − α if she shirks. By shirking she can thus reduce her suffering from inequity
aversion, and the above contract no longer provides sufficient effort incentives. Yet giving
agent 3 a larger share in the joint profit reduces the rents of agents 1 and 2. Thus, they no
longer allow agent 3 to join their partnership.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows how incentive provision in partnerships is affected if agents are inequity
averse in the sense of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Optimal contracts accounting for inequity
aversion involve simple, budget-balancing, and equal sharing rules. These optimal contracts
maximize all agents’ effort incentives; they are optimal not because agents have a preference
for equal sharing rules. Moreover, inequity aversion can provide all agents with sufficient
incentives to work in cases where this is unfeasible if agents only care for their own monetary
payoff and effort costs. Our results are arise since guilt, shame, or social sanctions reduces
a shirking agent’s utility precisely in those cases in which she actually shirks. As contracts
cannot condition on an agent’s effort decision, they cannot afflict the above punishment
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with equal precision. Thus, inequity aversion facilitates incentive provision. The conditions
under which inequity aversion permits cooperation amongst the agents depend on the size of
the team. They usually become less restrictive with decreasing size of the team, which fits
the common observation that small teams often work well whereas larger ones suffer from
free-riding. Summarizing, the present paper shows that inequity aversion and the associated
incentive effects could offer a fruitful new perspective on the internal organization of firms.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
A) Budget-balance is necessary for a vector S(K) of monetary payoffs to be renegotiation-
proof independently of the level of inequity aversion. Consider a S(K) with y(k) < x(K) for
K agents working yielding output x(K). Then S′(K) with s′i(K) = si(K)+[x(K)−y(K)]/N
for all i ∈ N increases the monetary payoff for all agents by an identical, strictly positive
amount while keeping the inequity between the agents unchanged. Therefore, all agents are
strictly better off under S′(K), and S(K) is not renegotiation-proof.
B) Budget-balance is also sufficient for S(K) to be renegotiation-proof if β < (N − 1)/N .
Given a budget-balancing S(K) consider any other S′(K) with different monetary payoffs.
Then there exists an agent i with s′i(K) < si(K). If β < (N − 1)/N , each agent’s utility is
strictly increasing in her monetary payoff even if the money taken away from her is given to
those agents with lower utility thus decreasing inequity. Therefore, at least agent i does not
agree to S′(K), and S(K) is renegotiation-proof.
C) If β ≥ (N − 1)/N then given an effort vector e with K agents working, a monetary payoff
vector S(K) is renegotiation-proof only if ui(e, S(K)) = uj(e, S(K)) for all i, j ∈ N and
S(K) is budget-balancing. Suppose S(K) is budget-balancing but there exist i, j ∈ N with
ui(e, S(K)) > uj(e, S(K)). Define A = {i ∈ N : ui(e, S(K)) ≥ uj(e, S(K))∀ j ∈ N} as the
set of agents with the highest utility, and AC = N \A as its complement. Denote by #A the
cardinality of A. Consider another S′(K) with new monetary payoffs s′i(K) = si(K)− ² for
all i ∈ A whereas s′j(K) = sj(K) + ² · (#A/#AC) for all j ∈ AC . Thus, no money is burnt
and S′(K) is budget-balancing. Choose ² > 0 sufficiently small so that for all i ∈ A, j ∈ AC
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we keep ui(e, S′(K)) ≥ uj(e, S′(K)). We can now check whether S′(K) is accepted by all
agents. All agents j ∈ AC receive higher monetary payoffs. Since for these agents payoffs
increase equally, suffering from inequity with respect to all agents in AC remains unchanged.
However, the suffering with respect to all agents i ∈ A is reduced. Thus, all agents j ∈ AC
prefer S′(K) to S(K). Equally, for all agents i ∈ A utility is changed by
vi(e, S′(K))− vi(e, S(K)) = −²+ β 1
N − 1
∑
j∈AC
[
²+ ² · #A
#AC
]
= ² ·
[
β
N
N − 1 − 1
]
≥ 0.
All agents i ∈ A thus weakly prefer S′(K) to S(K), and S(K) is not renegotiation-proof.
Therefore, ui(e, S(K)) = uj(e, S(K)) for all i, j ∈ N and budget-balance is necessary for a
contract to be renegotiation-proof.
D) If β ≥ (N−1)/N , budget-balance and, given e with K agents working, ui(e, S) = uj(e, S)
for all i, j ∈ N is also sufficient for a contract to be renegotiation-proof. If this condition
is satisfied, any changes in monetary payoffs implied by another S′(K) reduce the monetary
payoff of at least one agent. Let i be the agent whose payoff is reduced by the most. Then
ui(e, S′(K)) < ui(e, S(K)) and ui(e, S′(K)) ≤ uj(e, S′(K)) for all j ∈ N . Agent i’s rent is
reduced while in addition she now suffers from inequity with respect to some other agents. As
she prefers S(K) to S′(K), the monetary payoff vector S(K) is renegotiation-proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
A) If agents are sufficiently inequity averse, β ≥ (N − 1)/N , the ex-post distribution of
monetary payoffs is determined by renegotiation. Incentives depend on the anticipated
ex-post distribution of monetary payoffs. As the latter is independent of the initial contract
S, replacing any initial contract S with any other contract S′ being equal at the top and
with the same y(K) for K ∈ {N − 1, N} does not change incentives and Proposition 2 is
trivially satisfied.
B) For the remainder assume β < (N − 1)/N so that budget-balancing contracts are not
renegotiated and directly determine incentives. First, we show that any budget-balancing
contract S giving some agents unequal payoffs si(N) 6= sj(N) for some i, j ∈ N can be
transformed into a budget-balancing contract S′ with equal monetary payoffs s′i(N) = s
′
j(N)
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for all i, j ∈ N without impairing incentives.
Consider a budget-balancing contract S where si(N) 6= sj(N) for some i, j ∈ N . Define
B = {i ∈ N : si(N) ≤ sj(N)∀j ∈ N} as the set of agents with the lowest monetary
payoff if all agents work. B is non-empty and a strict subset of N . Define C as the subset
of agents from B who have the lowest monetary payoff in case one agent shirks so that
C = {i ∈ B : si(N − 1) ≤ sj(N − 1)∀ j ∈ N}. Note that C can be empty. For any agent
i ∈ N define Hi = {j ∈ N : sj(N − 1) − c > si(N − 1)} as the set of agents with a
strictly higher monetary payoff net of effort costs than agent i if agent i shirks and all
other agents work. Correspondingly, define Li = HCi = N \ Hi. Finally, let 〈ei, e∗−i〉 be an
effort vector e where all agents apart from agent i work, and agent i chooses effort ei ∈ {0, 1}.
Consider the following transformation of contract S resulting in contract S′:
1. Whenever more than one agent shirks, contract S′ and S are identical, S′(K) = S(K)
for all K ∈ {0, 1, .., N − 2}.
2. If one or no agent shirks, monetary payoffs of all agents i ∈ B are increased, s′i(N−1) =
si(N − 1) + ²(N − 1) and s′i(N) = si(N) + ²(N), where ²(N) and ²(N − 1) are strictly
positive constants.
3. If one or no agent shirks, monetary payoffs of all agents j ∈ BC = N \ B are reduced,
s′j(N − 1) = sj(N − 1)− γ ²(N − 1) and s′j(N) = sj(N)− γ ²(N), where γ = #B/#BC .
Thus, what is given to the agents in B is taken from the agents in BC so that y′(N−1) =
y(N − 1) and y′(N) = y(N), and S′ is again budget-balancing.
4. ²(N) and ²(N − 1) are chosen so that incentives for all agents i ∈ C to work if all other
agents work remain constant. The consequence of this property is explained below.
5. ²(N) and ²(N − 1) are chosen as large as possible but sufficiently small so that the
rank order of the agents is preserved in the following sense. For all i ∈ B, j ∈ BC ,
whenever sj(N) > si(N) then s′j(N) ≥ s′i(N). Further, if sj(N − 1) − c > si(N − 1)
then s′j(N − 1)− c ≥ s′i(N − 1). Finally, if sj(N − 1) > si(N − 1)− c then s′j(N − 1) ≥
s′i(N − 1) − c. Thus, whenever according to the initial contract S an agent j ∈ BC is
strictly better off than an agent i ∈ B if all agents work, if only agent i shirks or if only
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agent j shirks, then according to the new contract S′ she is not strictly worse off in the
corresponding situation.
We will now show that incentives are not impaired in this process. Given the above transfor-
mation only the inequity between agents i ∈ B with respect to agents j ∈ BC changes. The
change in incentives for all agents i ∈ C is thus given by
²(N) ·
[
1 + (1 + γ)
α#BC
N − 1
]
− ²(N − 1) ·
[
1 + (1 + γ) ·
(
α#(Hi ∩ BC)
N − 1 −
β#(Li ∩ BC)
N − 1
)]
.
As we are in the case where agents are not sufficiently inequity averse to agree to a reduction
in their monetary payoff in the course of potential renegotiations, agent i’s overall utility
vi(e, S(K)) is strictly increasing in her monetary payoff even if favorable inequity thus in-
creases. More formally, as β < (N − 1)/N and γ = #B/BC , ²(N − 1) is multiplied with a
strictly positive factor in the above expression. By choice of the set B, agents i ∈ B have the
lowest possible rank when all agents, including themselves, are working. Thus, these agents
can only improve in their rank by shirking. As some agents j ∈ BC may then be in Li (and
thus not in Hi), we must have #(Hi ∩ BC) ≤ #BC and #(Li ∩ BC) ≥ 0. The marginal
impact of an increase in monetary payoff depends negatively on an agent’s rank: the lower
the rank, the more unfavorable inequity is reduced, and the higher the marginal increase in
utility. Due to the argument above, an increase in the monetary payoff if all agents work has
a higher impact on utility than an increase in monetary payoff if one agent shirks. As ²(N)
and ²(N − 1) are chosen so that the above change in incentives is zero, we get
²(N) ≤ ²(N − 1)
as ²(N) is multiplied with a larger factor than ²(N − 1).
Consider now the incentives for any agent i ∈ B\C whenever this set is non-empty. Compared
to any agent j ∈ C we have si(N − 1) ≥ sj(N − 1) by definition of C and consequently
#(Hi ∩ BC) ≤ #(Hj ∩ BC) and #(Li ∩ BC) ≥ #(Lj ∩ BC). Thus, agents i ∈ B \ C will in
general improve their rank by more when shirking than agents j ∈ C. Since the marginal
impact of the increase ²(N − 1) in monetary payoff if one agent shirks is lower, the incentive
to work hard if all other agents work hard is at least preserved for any agent i ∈ B \ C as it
is at least as large as for any agent j ∈ C.
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Finally, consider any agent i ∈ BC , whose change in incentives is given by
−²(N)
[
γ − (1 + γ) β#B
N − 1
]
+ ²(N − 1)
[
γ + (1 + γ)
(
α#(Hi ∩ B)
N − 1 −
β#(Li ∩ B)
N − 1
)]
.
Again, the second factor of the above expression must be strictly positive as γ = #B/#BC
and β < (N − 1)/N . Since #(Hi ∩ B) ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ #(Li ∩ B) ≤ #B, the above expression
is at least weakly positive as ²(N − 1) ≥ ²(N), and all agents i ∈ BC keep their incentives
to work hard. Summarizing, the above transformation of the contract S does not harm
incentives. Iterated application of this transformation eventually results in a contract S′
with s′i(N) = s
′
j(N)∀ i, j ∈ N .
C) However, after the above transformations S is not yet necessarily equal at the top as
there might exist si(N − 1) 6= sj(N − 1) for at least some i, j ∈ N . In this case define
D = {i ∈ N : si(N − 1) ≥ sj(N − 1)∀j ∈ N} as the set of agents with the highest monetary
payoff if one agent shirks. D is non-empty and a strict subset of N . As the contract is equal
if all agents work we have si(N) = sj(N) for all i, j ∈ N and all agents get the same utility
if all agents work. As agents i ∈ D get the highest monetary payoff if one agent shirks, and
as their utility is increasing in their monetary payoff as β < (N − 1)/N , these agents have
the minimum incentive to work if all other agents work. It is then possible to find a budget-
balancing decrease of monetary payoffs si(N − 1) for i ∈ D and increase of sj(N − 1) for
i ∈ DC that decrease work incentives for workers in D but increases work incentives for the
other workers. Thus, minimum incentives to work are increased. Iteration of such changes
in the monetary payoff vector in case one agent shirks eventually results in a contract that
is equal at the top. Q.E.D.
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